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1. INTRODUCTION  
The embedding of activities seems to be challenged everyday by plant closures, 
relocations and installation mobility. Hence the idea of a deterritorialisation1 of 
activity, with activity gradually losing its roots, but first and foremost, losing the 
very use for these roots. Similarly, politicians seem powerless when faced with 
logics beyond their scope. Yet, reality is not that simple. Actually, the real issue 
here is to find the right frame to interpret the facts. The first hypothesis is that 
the rules of location have become more flexible, allowing more possibilities and 
bigger competition, in a conceptual framework which remains the same. The 
second consists in asserting the existence of a new framework invalidating part 
of our frame of reference, and therefore requiring the recasting of the principles 
of territorial organisation and the embedding issues. 
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1
 What is meant with this word is the decline of territory as a location factor. 
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The organisation of regional space and urban structures seems to endorse the 
first hypothesis. Indeed, it gives an impression of great stability and durability, 
which explains why numerous works try to describe and explain this balance. 
The idea of central places was expressed in the nineteenth century (Robic 1982), 
and later theorised by Christaller (1933/1966) and, with a different position, by 
Lösch (1944/1954); later on, other works went deeper into it, trying to account 
for the stability of the evolution. As far as geographers are concerned, Denise 
Pumain (1980) uses Gibrat’s model to report on some scalar variations which are 
capable of bringing to the fore ever stronger urban poles; the PARIS (Sanders 
1992) research team has worked extensively on questions of self-organisation; as 
for Fujita, Krugman and Venables. (2001), they contribute to a dynamic vision 
of regional structures by renewing the Christaller’s model and by following the 
path of self-organisation already explored in the 1980s (Krugman, 2008; Allen 
and Sanglier, 1979; Sanders, 1992). 
These models and theories face numerous fundamental problems. The first 
category gathers together the idea of the economic balance point of central 
spaces, of territorial optimum and, beyond that, the principle of market as the 
driving force behind territory organisation. Indeed, these elements struggle to 
account for the real behaviour of the participants, or for the capacity of the 
system to remain stable through various economic and political systems (Fache, 
2008a). The second category, which we are going to tackle in particular here, 
results from the current mutations induced by information and innovation. These 
two elements generate major upheavals in the functioning of cities, urban 
networks and regional systems, which have already been studied by numerous 
authors. Camagni (1992), for instance, defines new types of relations between 
cities that may or may not be hierarchical. Now, information and innovation 
introduce such thorough changes that even the most acknowledged theories must 
be revisited, revised and at least partly abandoned, which seems to be corrobo-
rating the hypothesis of the need for a new conceptual framework. This frame-
work is essential to consider public action in a more dynamic way. Indeed, any 
action implies a plan, and thus the understanding not of past organisations, but of 
organisations which are already on the way, following new parameters. 
The objective of this contribution is to propose two working hypotheses. 
First, the acentrality of space induced by the fundamental role of innovation in 
its structuring, and thus also by time and speed. Second, the idea that acentrality 
sets political players and the notion of territorial plan at the core of space 
structuring, with economy mostly adapting itself to the new deal (Fache 2008a). 
The first issue to be investigated is the relationship between innovation and 
the evolution of territories. It conditions the processes of territory destabilisation 
and fragmentation, opening the way for new territorial hierarchies and organisa-
tions, and new roles for key players, especially politicians. 
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2. INNOVATION, SPEED AND DECONSTRUCTION OF FORMER  
RELATIONS  
The structuring of space and territories stems from innovation, and now aims 
increasingly at innovation. Though this principle is getting more and more 
obvious, it is not mentioned in standard works dealing with the geography of 
activities (e.g. Mérenne-Schoumaker, 2002; Géneau de Lamarlière and Staszak, 
2000). It is nevertheless essential. Placing it at the heart of the process changes 
the whole picture. 
2.1. Innovation as Core Principle: Structuring through Innovative Poles  
It has been a while since innovation conquered a decisive place within economic 
processes. Focusing on the role of the entrepreneur, Schumpeter has introduced  
a dimension essential to corporations, markets and economic cycles of all kinds 
(Shumpeter, 1935/1999). This innovation also provides an insight into the 
process of territorial accumulation, akin to the innovative milieus developed by 
the GREMI (1987; Camagni and Maillat, 2006). Innovation is also at the heart of 
diffusion models, from Hagerstrand’s (1953/1967) models to the latest develop-
ments. However, it is not at the heart of space structuring processes. It is de facto 
introduced as a constituent in a system governed by broader, sometimes exclu-
sive cost issues. In that regard, the dynamic model proposed by Fujita, Krugman 
and Venables (2001) is based on data like transport costs, salaries and trade 
barriers, but not in the least on innovation. It is thus an essential parameter, but 
which remains outside the territorial system. 
Today, this position is no longer appropriate, because innovation2 is at the 
heart of everything: products, process, organisation… That being the case, how 
could a geographical system escape the impact of innovation? 
This impact takes various, easily perceptible forms. The first one is linked to 
the increasing structuring weight of the poles which are capable of mastering 
innovation in its entirety. These poles often belong to the category of metropo-
lises, which may give the impression that innovation is only strengthening the 
commanding power of long-established structures. Actually, it is possible to 
interpret things the other way around. In the past, metropolises were not influen-
tial because of some specific commanding power, but because of their capacity 
to master the innovations of their time. To start with a light approach: the ‘Paris 
                                                 
2
 We use the term of innovation in a broad way. It integrates technology, but also what has to do 
with creativity, like design, which is partly linked to fashion trends or innovative political 
decisions. This approach is common to a majority of researchers of the ‘Industries et emplois’ 
group of the CNFG (cf. S. Daviet, J. Fache, S. Montagné-Villette etc.). 
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fashion’ boutiques of yore show how a pole can be a leader and have a strong 
influence on behaviours. Concretely, it shows how one fashion pole can dictate 
the life and pace of life of whole cities, as it was the case for Lyons, which used 
to be specialised in textile industry and ready-to-wear clothing, and thus depend-
ent on such fashion trends. As a consequence, Lyons won its status as a leader in 
the field of chemistry and artificial colouring (Laferrère, 1960). The same thing 
occurred in the Cholet area, where the ready-to-wear business is strongly linked 
to the fashion market (Montagné-Villette, 1987). More generally speaking, 
innovation is a structural key, including for small and medium cities which 
position themselves according to it, and not necessarily in the sole field of 
technology. To keep the example of the Cholet area, this industrial district is 
now embarking on the adventure of the ‘Child Pole’, an original competitiveness 
cluster betting on an innovative and trans-disciplinary concept. 
Therefore, the impact of innovation can hardly be described as new. It may 
even be the essential purpose of the urban, metropolitan system and of regional 
organisations. What is now changing is the dimension of the phenomenon, the 
awareness of its importance, the conceptualisation of correlated development, 
and finally the fact that it is a real driving force which generates a world of 
knowledge economy. But it has been overshadowed by some factors, including 
the pace of the spreading of innovation. For instance, Hagerstrand’s (1953/1967) 
seminal works are developed within a framework of connections between a pole 
and the spaces which are inside its zone of influence, on decades-long scales of 
time. Hence the appearance of immobility, permanency and inertia. Michel 
Rochefort’s (1960) works efficiently bring to light spatial logics based on 
distribution networks and zones of influence, which correspond to a historically 
dated way of functioning. But he also emphasizes the major role of politics to 
shape this organisation, with or without a planning vision for that matter. 
This first impact is in keeping with the theories which have been putting 
innovation at the heart of industrial production for the last 50 years. Vernon’s 
product life cycle brought about numerous adaptations, especially territorial 
ones. Industrial districts (Ritter, 2000), tourist resorts, science parks (Daviet and 
Fache, 2008) and many forms of development and/or territorial planning follow 
cycles, which are related to their innovative dimension and to the introduced 
territorial differential. Most studies focus on local areas, and therefore offer only 
a partial vision of territorial organisation. It is hardly surprising, because even if 
there are general macroeconomic processes, local cycles are often specific, 
independent from one another. For instance, the current cycle in Nantes is based 
on its asserted status as regional capital in the West of France, and is discon-
nected from the redevelopment cycle of the Cholet area, and from the accumula-
tion around the Yon valley; the dynamics in the Aix area answer to logics which 
are much different from those of Marseilles (Morel, 2000) etc. However, one 
cycle in place X will change the cycle in place Y. The consequences of creating 
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a biotech park largely depend on the national and international environment, and 
thus on the existence of other poles and on their stage of development. The 
difficulty is to look beyond these cycles and try to find a more comprehensive 
explanation for seemingly disconnected entities. 
2.2. The Break in the Pace of Evolution 
The second aspect of this impact, the most destabilising one for territories, is 
without a doubt speed. It is as logical as the first aspect: former product cycles 
have grown shorter, sometimes drastically, causing fleeting setting-ups and 
investments. Future 28µm micro-component factories are bound to have a two-
year life expectancy only (Fache, 2009)! Besides, the technological rush of 
countries and companies requires ever-hasty discoveries and innovations, to 
such an extent that they tend to merge in some sectors like biotechnologies. For 
that reason, notions like anchorage and heritage change completely. The crucial 
question is now to know how increasingly fragile installations can establish 
themselves in destabilized territories. The question of the adaptability of 
territories also needs to be considered. Indeed, the challenge of innovation and 
integration into knowledge economy is already tricky as it is. The challenge of 
speed may quickly become a wager, even for well-established poles. For 
instance, in just a few years, a high-tech city like Grenoble has seen the Mo-
torola-Freescale firm invest in its research potential by building an expensive 
research centre (2004), only to pull out from the area 4 years later.3 But for 
regions whose economic base is neither particularly innovative nor technologi-
cal, the challenge is even greater. Saarbrücken, the capital of the Saarland state 
in Germany, is now facing such a trial and trying to redevelop, this time focus-
ing on innovative activities, notably in computer science, but it has difficulty 
emerging (Gobin, 2007; 2008a). It is true that speed raises the problem of the 
time differential between politics and companies as regards regional and urban 
planning. 
These simple facts have major consequences on territories. First of all, the 
very idea of territorial balance and optimum, omnipresent in the literature, loses 
much of its explanatory strength. Indeed, the basic principles of regional and 
urban organization apply to relatively long periods of time, during which the 
setting up of an industrial plant, for example, gets integrated into a structural 
logic of space. Henceforth, the cyclical logic prevails. Then, the question of the 
global coherence arises. Actually, the setting-ups, migrations or sudden disap-
                                                 
3
 Freescale did not renew its participation to the Crolles II agreement, thus striking a deathblow at 
the local scientific and industrial coalition. Grenoble turned to other partnerships, and industrials 
like STMicroelectronics did the same with IBM. Therefore, the management of territorial 
development becomes challenging, and has to adapt itself on extremely short scales of time. 
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pearances of activities obey local logics. The general articulation seems chaotic, 
and the territorial embedding a past notion. Finally, this general articulation is 
still to be defined, using not a single rule, but several differential rules. 
Innovation happens in place X according to place Y, and what is to occur at time 
T will be fundamentally different according to context. It amounts to saying that  
it might be possible to define a type of evolution at a given time for a given 
place, but that making broad statements is very complicated, not to say impossi-
ble as such.  
3. GLOBAL INFORMATION, URBAN DEVELOPMENT PLANS 
The key role of innovation sets information and knowledge at the heart of the 
system. Just like innovation, their role in regional and urban structuring is not 
new. The difference lies in technologies which allow information to be trans-
ported, stored and treated, since this treatment produces increasingly complex 
information. The speed of information, which keeps pace with the increasing 
speed of innovation, triggers new problems, linked notably with the difference 
between the time of companies and that of technology. At a time when the 
industrial, technical and technological culture of places is essential,4 this 
differential is particularly disturbing and questions the adaptability of territories 
when faced with general destabilisation, even when the biggest metropolises are 
concerned. 
3.1. Immediacy, Acquisition  
The essential characteristic of the current informational world is the immediate 
access to an infinite mass of information. Admittedly, equipment creates at once 
a difference between the territories which are integrated into the system and 
those which are marginalised. The spiral of flows is going to make all the more 
damages since the ADSL technology using telephone lines is reaching its limit. 
Now, the ongoing thin cabling of the territory starts with metropolises, with 
interoperability and trade agreements between French telephone and internet 
companies as main obstacle.  
                                                 
4
 Many works have insisted on this dimension, starting with Marshall’s (1890) seminal work, and 
the multiple works of researchers on districts since the 1970s: Becattini (1992), Benko and Lipietz, 
(1992), SPL and milieux innovateurs (Aydalot, 1986); Camagni and Maillat (2006). Geographers 
(Daviet, 2005) come to similar conclusions. 
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Fig. 1. From Christallerian structures to informational structures 
 
But beyond this technical aspect, immediacy radically changes spatial 
connections. Indeed, the Christallerian and Löschian spatial connections used to 
be mainly based on informational connections between the cities which held 
information that could not easily cover great distances, and those which did not. 
Besides, the administrative meshing in developed countries had much more to 
do with the informative mastery of the territory than with the search for eco-
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nomic balance. More and more administrative and political centralities came up 
in the course of time, along with ever stronger links between the information 
centre and its relays. We went from provinces in Ancient Rome, to counties in 
kingdoms and empires in the Middle Ages, whose power increased proportion-
ally to the remoteness of the commanding centre, then to increasingly subordi-
nated centres, from intendants in the Ancien Régime to prefects in modern 
history5 (figure 1, time 1). 
Nowadays, the most diverse central places have direct and immediate access 
to information (figure 1, time 2). Such immediacy challenges everything, 
starting with hierarchical links. Standard hierarchical pyramids are now replaced 
by a system in which every place in a given space can contact any other place. 
Everything thus seems possible, and according to some schools of thought, 
notably regarding clusters, not only is networked space possible at various scalar 
levels, but it also generates multiform configurations in which numerous types 
of spaces can meet. This results in public actions whose scientific validity is yet 
to be demonstrated. High-tech clusters organised in network, the German 
kompetenznetze, or even recent inter-clustering policies are based on the implicit 
belief that in this informational world, almost all configurations are possible, and 
that policy-makers can set off technological proximities that take the place of 
space agglomerates and localized accumulations. Again, reality is not that 
simple (Rallet and Torre 2007). 
The reconsideration of the proximity and territorial continuity connection has 
another consequence. The main issue is not to receive information anymore, but 
to be able to transform it, thus establishing the classic difference between 
information and knowledge. The polarities structuring regional space are the 
ones that can receive, transform with some local added value, and emit a flow 
which is slightly different from the one they receive, but we will get back to this. 
That might seem insignificant, but it is not. Indeed, for centuries, numerous 
cities have only been information relays, and have kept a substantial workforce 
to treat information. The whole administration network in modern countries and 
in international firms was based on that. Companies like IBM have weaved  
a network of regional management relays – sometimes even local ones, when the 
market was suitable – whose role was to manage commercial and technical 
information for a given space. 
Things have radically changed since then. Indeed, with ICTs, it is now possi-
ble to manage an increasing amount of ordinary, standardised information, and 
to treat it automatically. This means that the role of information relays is now 
obsolete. They will not disappear instantly, but public utilities and company 
                                                 
5
 The combined reading of many synthesis works shows the importance of politics, but also of fate 
in the moulding of central places and urban networks which later shaped the embedding points of 
economic activity (Mumford, 1964; Pinol, 2003; Agulhon, 1983; Roncayolo, 1985). 
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administrations are going through numerous reorganisations, aimed at skipping 
these relays or decreasing their importance. For example, the complete revision 
of the French tax office network, bank network or of services which used to be 
public and are now under privatisation, like post offices, is undermining 
traditional connections in the territory. In a large metropolis, this restructuring 
goes unnoticed. In a rural village, it may come as a shock, all the more so since 
there is sometimes a direct dependence on public or semi-public employment. 
Besides, the decision to nationally decentralise information processing centres to 
mid-sized cities moves the heart of information according to new logics. In the 
private sector, the location logics of call centres, or the system of on-line sales, 
are a sign of time. They show that companies are now able to treat continental, 
even global information from a unique data centre. The role of complex informa-
tion is made even more obvious. The very idea of community service becomes 
blurred. However, the accumulation of such small facts, which often go unno-
ticed when considered separately, raises the broader issue of the utility of  
a central place, whatever its dimensions, because now ordinary information has 
no specific reason to be treated there. 
Consequently, if a city, whatever the size, wants to exist, it has to bring 
something more to global information. This extra value is necessarily connected 
to time, and so it evolves according to innovation and knowledge, as we will see 
later. 
3.2. The Fragmented Space  
This informational organisation changes the very structure of space. Indeed, 
informational relations between the various elements of the urban networks 
cannot be taken for granted anymore, they need to be justified. The city loses its 
almost natural role and has to build itself one. Thus, the structure of space in 
hubs and spokes, analysed in the 1980s, illustrates the bypassing of established 
hierarchies and networks to establish new ones (De Roo, 1993). Camagni’s 
(1992) analysis show the same thing under a different angle, by putting forward 
the connections between cities, and how they become more complex and 
renewed, as opposed to the established hierarchy. But the current territories of 
innovation dismantle the structure of relations even more. Indeed, the former 
transverse possibilities complicated the plan. Now, it is the very existence of the 
plan that is questioned. For instance, in the area of Nantes, towns like Ancenis 
are integrated into a metropolitan system. Other towns have specific and original 
dynamics (La Roche sur Yon and the plastics processing industry). Finally, 
others are undergoing either a structural crisis which raises the issue of their 
integration into the Nantes system (Cholet), or a deep crisis which raises doubts 
about their possible recovery (Châteaubriant).  
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The same problem arises everywhere and on every scale. Saarbrücken, a mid-
sized land capital, operates as an isolated entity, and has a strategy of integration 
into knowledge economy which is independent from what takes place in nearby 
cities. There are some cooperation attempts (the cross-border Saarbrücken-East 
Moselle metropolis; the Quattropole, a network of four cities), but in the end, it 
leads to few concrete results (Gobin, 2007, 2008a). Besides, as far as innovation 
is concerned, the city is stuck in a difficult situation. Given its size, Saarbrücken 
needs to cooperate with its rival cities, but at the same time, it might be taken 
over as a satellite town. 
To switch to another perspective, the Irish city of Cork also has its own, very 
offensive strategy, banking on a combination of Irish and local assets. The Irish 
assets are those which generated the ‘Celtic tiger’ miracle (Walsh, 2007, p. 55) 
(European grants, fiscal strategies targeting FDI, return of the American-
Irish…). Cork’s main asset is the location of the city in the South, and thus its 
ambition to become a ‘gateway’ to Ireland, an interface. In addition to that, the 
city has launched the building of a park science connected to the university 
(Guihard 2008). This strategy has generated much growth, but also some 
vulnerability, which was brutally confirmed by the 2008 crisis, when many sites 
closed down as fast as they had opened. 
Thus this informational revolution changes the very nature of spatial prox-
imity. Physical proximity within territorial continuity used to be the standard. 
Now, the notion of territorial continuity does not have the same meaning 
anymore. 
Space is fragmented even in its operating logics. Multiple cells of various 
sizes work in juxtaposition, either jointly or discretely. The nature of connec-
tions has changed completely. Indeed, once operating according to a classic 
hierarchical order, spatial relations are now based either on a power struggle, or 
on a spirit of cooperation. To go back to the case of the Cholet area, the city has 
been compelled to include a high level of cooperation with Nantes and Angers 
within its strategy. Indeed, the idea of the ‘Child Pole’6 is based on the connec-
tion and interaction of all the types of skills that have to do with children (Fache, 
Leblond and Vallée, 2005). Yet, the Cholet area has very low expertise in some 
of these fields (educational games software, for example, with a single leading 
company established in the area), and none in others (child psychology, paediat-
rics). It is thus necessary for it to try and work with nearby knowledge clusters, 
even if the outcome is uncertain. Indeed, as far as child-oriented medical skills 
are concerned, there is no reason why Nantes would chose to give up expending 
sectors, especially since its declared strategy is to create a European-class 
biocluster, and it already has difficulty competing with existing bioclusters of 
the same category (Fache, Bambou, Billaud and Le Nuz, 2009). 
                                                 
6
 Child pole = Pôle Enfant. 
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In other cases, the economic power struggle leads to a whole region being 
overpowered by another. The Toulouse region constitutes a good example, as the 
Airbus system is based on an extremely strong centre-margin relationship, which 
affects both population and commercial issues (Zuliani and Leriche, 2003; 
Zuliani, 2005b; Zuliani and Jalabert, 2005). Moreover, this functioning brings 
about the reversal of the regional structure, because the classic ascending 
relationship – with the city being the product of its development region, or of its 
regional hinterland, as Christaller would say – is reversed and replaced by  
a structure in which the region becomes the product, the ‘child’ of a ruling 
metropolis (Fache 2008b; Anderson 1993). This logic has been identified by 
Hall (1966, 1999; Derudder and Witlox, 2004) in his work about world cities, 
which embody in his opinion an advanced level of the Christallerian system, 
which followed a different logic. What is different about the current evolution is 
that the process is spreading, and do not affect only very large cities any more, 
but also mid-sized cities. 
3.3. Competition, Cooperation: Squaring the Circle  
The consequence of this explosion is the increasing competition between 
territories. Henceforth, with the loosening of local networks and the new 
opportunities on hand, anything is possible. At least, it is a widespread opinion. 
This situation results in territories constantly wavering between cooperation and 
competition, with the latter option apparently prevailing. 
As such, the use of the term ‘metropolis’ is quite evocative. Almost every 
French capital of region likes to think of itself as a metropolis. The logic beyond 
their action is clear. With the development of science parks, cities tend to focus 
on this model. They all want their own technological pole, sometimes more than 
is sensible. The efforts to achieve territorial cooperation meet the exact same 
objective: achieving the networking of some mid-sized cities to reach a rather 
imprecise threshold, from which they can make up together a European-level 
metropolis.7 These gatherings go against local-scale political strategies, and for 
independent spaces, it is next door to impossible to unite on a joint spatial 
project (Gobin, 2008b).8 For instance, in the West of France, the cities of Nantes 
and Rennes have been rivals for ages, and it is still difficult for them to work as 
a team. Brest will not be easily connected to a network either. Surely, many 
                                                 
7
 The ambitious call for projects on metropolitan cooperation in 2005 is consistent with this 
perspective. Cf Agences d’Urbanisme et de Développement de l’Ouest (2006), APEREAU/ 
DIACT (2006). 
8
 The research of Gobin (2008b) shows very accurately the tangle of political structures and the 
competitions between structures of power like urban communities and cities on one hand, and 
regions on the other hand. 
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obstacles can be overcome with ICTs, but in the end, there is still an actual 
physical distance to be covered by people and goods. 
The metropolitan fever does not stop at our borders. Many mid-sized cities 
try to play in the major league. In that regard, European classifications are not 
neutral, as for many policies, they come out with objectives which are far from 
being plain reference points. Nantes regrets ranking below the fiftieth place in 
Europe and wishes to climb up the hierarchy, whatever the classification; Lyons 
calls attention to its progress of several ranks up in the classifications as a sign of 
political success. 
These circumstances seriously question some political actions, as polycen-
trism, which has been underlined by the SDEC (Peyrony, 2002) and integrated 
to the meshed polycentrism policy of former DATAR. Actually, in addition to 
differences in the very definition of polycentrism, these actions recommend the 
preservation of the Christallerian structure inherited from decades, not to say 
centuries of socio-spatial practices. Cities of any size become indispensable to 
the organisation of the territory and to the life of its inhabitants (Allain, Baudelle 
and Guy 2003). True, it may be advisable to avoid metropolitan overcentralisa-
tion, but the real problem is to know if the territory which is defined by these 
schools of thought still exists, and if it does so on two levels. 
The first level is the economic rationale for companies, and knowledge econ-
omy in particular. At the present time, concentration is acceptable, especially 
regarding rare skills. Thus, high tech activities, which are often real driving 
forces, are grouped together in more or less compact, interrelated cluster.9 Now 
this sometimes extreme logic of metropolitanisation is totally at odds with that 
of polycentrism. 
The second deals with lifestyles. Populations in developed countries are ur-
ban, and those in developing countries are on the way to becoming so. But what 
kind of cities are we talking about? World metropolises? Region capitals of 
500,000 inhabitants? Towns of 10,000 inhabitants? If there is undoubtedly  
a renewed interest in mid-sized cities, it is hardly the case for small towns, 
especially if they are isolated. Because this is the point: numerous small and 
medium cities develop in the orbit of a powerful metropolis which prompts 
them. Are cities like Angers and Le Mans growing because of their attractive-
ness or because they are close to Paris? Of course, the answer is not crystal-
clear, but it is enough to question some dogmas of polycentrism. 
Actually, every entity goes its own way, which often strays away from centu-
ries-long lines of thinking, but also from the life of the population itself. In that 
regard, politics plays an essential role, because, as polycentrism shows, it is 
                                                 
9
 It is the case for biotechnologies, for example. Cf. Zeller (2004). It is also the case for aeronaut-
tics, but with different constitution logics. Cf. Beckouche (1996); Fache (2005, 2007); Zuliani 
(2005a). 
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obvious that the structure of a territory is influenced by social and cultural 
practices and by political action, which tend to induce inertia, as much as it is 
shaped by economic flows. It is thus necessary to look for other theoretical 
tracks to deal with regional and urban networks. 
4. THE SPATIAL DEVELOPMENT PLAN BEFORE THE ECONOMIC LAW  
To leave on new tracks means studying the elements of structure in a territory. 
Innovation implies a certain number of new principles. 
4.1. A Geography of Sensors  
Economic geography tends increasingly to be a geography of transmitters – 
transformers – receivers (which we shall call TTRs by convenience). Indeed, as 
we have seen already, integrating the knowledge and innovation economy 
implies the ability not only to integrate information flows, but above all to bring 
something more, some transformation and extra value to the circulating informa-
tion (figure 2). Without this essential transformation, activities have no particu-
lar reason for settling in city X, which would de facto be reduced to a hardly 
useful transmitter-receiver. These specific points may establish some manufac-
turing or assembly work, but they belong to the category of interchangeable 
informational spaces. The final aim is not to be easily interchangeable anymore. 
This logic corresponds to a radical change in the functioning of territories, 
whose informational role is being questioned, as we have seen. Some territories 
build up around this strong informational role (Grenoble − Bernardy, 1996; 
Boisgontier and Bernardy 1988; Cambridge…), sometimes after starting from 
almost nothing (Sophia-Antipolis − Fouich, 1977). Others are in great difficulty 
in this new system. For instance, mining cities are trying to redevelop through 
innovation and knowledge, but with doubtful results. The basin of Lens is 
steadily declining, and for the moment, engineering schools and the university 
have not produced the expected effects. Creating knowledge is not the most 
difficult part. What is problematic is its location, or its embedding once the 
people are qualified. And Lille and Paris are quite close to Lens… 
This situation conjures up the major question for any centre space, which is 
to know which type of TTR it can be or become. For international-level me-
tropolises, the question hardly arises, since they may be engaged in a wild 
competition with its rivals, while remaining integrated into an information 
exchange network. For small towns, the local informational role also seems 
granted. Populations need local centres for many administrative functions and 
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basic services. Between both lies the core of the problem. Indeed, many subpre-
fectures, for instance, are undermined by new technologies, and so are many 
industrial cities. So they need to come out with a new position. 
 
INCOMING
INFORMATION
INCOMING
INFORMATION
OUTCOMING
INFORMATION
OUTCOMING
INFORMATION
CITY X
CITY X
FIRST CASE: TRANSMITTERS – RECEIVERS
SECOND CASE: TRANSMITTERS – TRANSFORMERS – RECEIVERS (TTR)
 
 
Fig. 2. From informational centres to TTR 
 
In fact, TTRs have a status that do not depend on their inherited position or 
their size anymore. A city like Grenoble owes a part of its success to legacy, but 
has a status among innovation spaces which has nothing to do with its demo-
graphic weight. The most important thing is the capacity of a city to make plans, 
and thus to constantly develop its legacy and local potential. This progressive 
approach concurs with the school of thought of innovative sectors. 
4.2. A Centrality: The Political Project at the Core 
This geography of sensors highlights the characteristic acentrality of space 
(Fache, 2007, 2008a, b). Acentrality is the quality of a central space whose 
social and economic organisation is in no way connected to pre-existent laws 
and balances, which tend to ‘naturally’ establish themselves in the name of 
economic rationality principles, among other things. Acentrality consists in 
asserting that spatial organisations result from social, cultural and economic 
constructions which mostly have nothing to do with economic laws to begin 
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with, but rather with strategic, administrative and political logics; economy also 
plays a part, but only to some extent. In numerous cases, economy adapts itself 
to existing circumstances (Fache, 2008a). Acentrality is not a new characteristic 
of space. It has always been there. But it has been concealed for a very long time 
by multiple factors, such as the rugosity of space, the difficulty for information 
and innovation to circulate, the weight of subsistence economy… Only recently 
has technological progress allowed spaces to gradually emancipate from some 
constraints (Duprat, 2006), therefore highlighting this principle. Acentrality 
underlines the construction of territories, thus the role of politics, which has been 
omnipresent in the examples quoted above, as well as in history. 
History brings us tools to understand the role of politics. The development of 
mining cities in Europe and in the United States brought out very different 
results according to the political criterion. In Europe, nineteenth century extrac-
tion was coupled with a political and administrative structuring of places which 
induced that, once the coal cycle was over, public authorities maintained the 
same spatial organisation and tried in a proactive way to substitute another 
economic engine for the weakening mining. In the United States, western mining 
answered a mere logic of plunder economy. Minimal political and administrative 
structuring did the rest: the end of exploitation cycles often lead to the disappear-
ing of population centres. True, context and temporality were much different and 
the comparison is somewhat delicate. But the fragility of purely economic 
dynamics is apparent in many other cases, including in Europe. The trading 
towns established on the Baltic Sea during the Hanseatic League period have 
met different ends, depending on their politicisation and administrative estab-
lishment (Pinol, 2003). 
Besides, the role of politics is also relevant in the making of economic centre 
spaces. Policies like privileges, mercantilism or, at a local level, fiscal 
exemptions for markets and fairs, are obvious signs of this. And so is the 
development of university poles, which often have political or religious origins. 
Closer to us is the development of scientific and economic centres, which also 
has to do with politics. In the field of biotechnologies or microelectronics, 
equipments like particle accelerators are essential, especially since a network of 
micro-enterprises cannot invest in large and expensive equipments. Population 
proximity may then be misleading sometimes, since it is distorted by the 
technical dimension. 
Beyond the obvious role of politics lies the question of meaning. Indeed, the 
classic school of thought of spatial theorisation holds as basic principle, either 
explicitly like Christaller and Lösch, or implicitly, that politics are meant to 
make the liberal capitalist system more efficient, and thus to allow spatial 
development to be more efficient. But one cannot fail to notice that mere facts 
prove this theoretical and ideological wish to be both inaccurate (as Lösch 
realised from the start) and questionable. Actually, public action ties in with both 
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tendencies, either trying to adapt to some economic rules, or trying to modify 
them for reasons which deviate from strictly economic logics.10 
Therefore, the idea of construction do not set the business rationale, but the 
urban territorial plan for local or regional development at the heart of spatial 
organisation. This plan implies a territorial strategy. Generally speaking, what is 
remarkable in the evolution of public action is that the business rationale is 
increasingly integrated into a general territorial system also including culture 
and society (Arvanitis, and Petrakos, 2006). For instance, Nantes bets on the 
redevelopment of its old shipyards and the building of a new city district on the 
Isle of Nantes (Fache, 2008c; Devisme, 2001, 2007). This urban plan plays on 
the image of the city, its cultural dimension and its individuation, and is much 
alike the type of projects carried out in Florida, without acknowledging it. 
In Norway, the city of Bergen deals with the economic issue in an all-
encompassing way, again with a combination of actions focused on innovation 
and research, but also on culture and heritage, with a part of the city centre being 
classified as a UNESCO world heritage site (Deraeve, 2008). The case of 
Bergen is interesting in many respects. Indeed, beyond its rather common 
strategy, it raises the issue of the confrontation of scales within the context of 
globalization. Within Norway, Bergen is at the top of urban hierarchy, and is 
therefore a metropolis, that is to say an economic and intellectual commanding 
centre. 
But the integration to a global system changes scales. Bergen becomes an 
ordinary city in terms of size and has difficulty achieving recognition, as regards 
its number of researchers for example. Therefore, the Norwegian scale is 
strongly disrupted by the scale induced by global urban networks. A city on top 
of hierarchy can become an insignificant central space at the European and 
world scale. The strategy of politics is thus complicated, because it do not 
correspond to the current reality of the city and its rank in Norway, but to its 
projection in a world system which weakens it. 
These two examples, taken out of an endless number of others, bring to mind 
another aspect. If the acentrality of space shows itself gradually, and if the role 
of plans and strategies is reinforced, the situation of territories becomes more 
and more unstable. Indeed, inertia is shaken by political innovation and by the 
cycle which de facto imposes itself as for any innovation. Concretely, the 
question is not only to act anymore, but to act at the right time, while differenti-
ating from other territories. It was the case for the cycle of science parks. 
This example is significant. Indeed, creating a science park only makes sense 
when it allows a territory to become part of the information and knowledge 
                                                 
10
 The 1979 study of Allen and Sanglier is very interesting in that regard, because its auto-
organising approach also includes a new perspective on politics which are responsible, in their 
opinion, for the modification of the conceptualized order. 
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space, but also to establish a differential advantage against other territories. 
Sophia-Antipolis and Meylan have achieved that, using radically different 
models of development, among other things because they were science park 
pioneers which had established a strong differential against other territo-
ries(Ciapetti, 2009). Political innovation then spread and lost some of its power 
(Daviet and Fache, 2008). Launching such operations does not make much sense 
today, except for specialized scientific and economic centres which support and 
revitalise a sector (biotechnologies in Paris or in Lyons, for example). As  
a result, there are not new technology parks created today in France, because 
with already more than forty structures, most of the top of the urban hierarchy 
is equipped, but also because such an equipment would not be capable any-
more to generate the necessary differential for such a development to be 
relevant anyway. To achieve recognition, a territory now needs other political 
innovations. 
Another element to consider: cycles are getting shorter, and the advantages 
they generate are more and more transitory. Indeed, the benchmarking studies 
supported by many cities and regions allow a faster spreading of information, 
and the possible duplication of what has worked well in some place. In that 
regard, the redevelopment of Bilbao has gained major following. Exchanges of 
experiences are besides widely promoted, as with the REVIT (2007) program in 
the European Union. It is thus necessary for a territory to always try and have  
a head start. There are major territorial repercussions at stake, and sometimes 
they can be devastating. A project requires appropriate human resources. 
Sometimes, these resources run out, or they aren’t qualified and skilled enough. 
The primacy of innovation propels in the foreground high qualifications and the 
capacity to be creative and to flexible, to get the information and transform it. 
Again, TTRs are essential there. But many cities can not afford them. Thus the 
numerous plant lockouts and relocations which regularly make the headlines can 
surely be read as the result of some economic processes, but also as the sign of 
the tremendous difficulty through which some territories go to set up a viable 
plan and adapt to the new deal. It must be acknowledged that big metropolises 
are also subjected to site lockouts. What’s different about them is obviously their 
size, their diversity, but above all their capacity to prepare for the future, as 
showed by Sarah Bambou’s work on biotechnologies in Paris (Bambou, 2009). 
This analysis raises the delicate issue of time. Indeed, if innovation requires 
the structuring of space, it also induces strong differentials in temporal evolu-
tion. In other words, while metropolises run up the stairs, depressed cities have 
to reinvent their basic skills, their economic foundations and their integration to 
the system. Naturally, this takes a great deal of time, because a new plan deals 
with technical matters, but most of all with mentalities and culture. These 
dimensions are essential in the structuring of territories (Daviet, 2005). 
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Thus central places develop in places which are often in no way prepared for 
anything like this, and their future depends to a great extent on local actors’ 
initiatives, which can completely turn the system one way or another. 
4.3. Temporalities of Political Action  
In such a context, political action has to include the temporal dimension to 
achieve efficiency. Indeed, the incorporation of the new information networks or 
of the principle of acentrality has to be coupled with some reflection about the 
moment when action is taken. So, political action can be considered as innova-
tion, and treated as such (Daviet and Fache, 2008). Therefore, it is essential to 
consider the general situation as regards TTRs during the initiative. 
The field of biotechnologies is significant in that regard. The development of 
activities related to so-called modern biotechnologies was achieved very early in 
some dominant central places like Paris, Cambridge or the Silicon Valley in the 
1970s, in keeping with functioning and financing procedures which brought to 
mind the emergence of electronics in the 1950s (Binder, 2008). When cities like 
Montpelier (Brunet, Grasland, Garnier, Ferras and Volle, 1988) or Strasbourg 
entered the biotech race between the 1970s and 1980s, they were just a small 
step behind the Silicon Valley or Paris. The main differential here has less to do 
with chronology than with the very structure of the sector, which was dominated 
to a great extent by public players in France, while big companies were being 
created in California. Each city leaned on a tradition of research on human 
health, or sometimes other topics, like in Montpellier. 
But some cities like Nantes experienced a very slow and particularly late 
start, because they had no preceding knowledge of the field. The Atlanpole 
science park was created in 1987, but the political impulse towards biotech-
nologies only arrived only about ten years later, in a world where powerful 
polarities were already well-established and could drastically disrupt the 
development of emergent poles by sizing its start-ups and researchers. The 
embedding of a company like Eurofins, a success story in Nantes, is regularly 
questioned. 
What must be acknowledged in particular is that while politics are trying to 
develop emergent biotech centres, the oldest poles are already moving on. Green 
technologies are becoming a reality in the Silicon Valley, where young compa-
nies have already exceeded ‘simple’ start-ups by their size and importance, and 
are likely to become real giants in this field (Nora, 1990). Therefore, the 
question of public action shifts. Now, the real question is: to what extent is the 
intrinsically relevant strategy of development put into perspective, or even 
neutralized by some new context at a precise time? 
Spatial Theory, Temporality and Public Action 
 
37 
5. CONCLUSION  
The question of the embedding and mobility of activity and population, of their 
territorialisation or de-territorialisation, arises in the fundamentally new frame of 
innovation, information and acentral space today. This perspective conjures up 
an answer which is different from the easy discourse that is now prevailing about 
the de-territorialisation of activities. The embedding of activity is still relevant 
today. The problem of modern societies is that the word ‘embedding’ has 
changed meaning. The Christallerian and Löschian viewpoint is over, as the 
notion of balance is now questioned. Spatial installation is more and more 
unstable, but not necessarily fleeting. In other words, the original frame which 
allowed the installation and embedding of an activity has to be constantly 
developed, or rather reconstructed. The question of time, speed and adaptability 
arises with renewed intensity and is difficult to solve, because politics and 
societies are still relying on the Löscho-Christallerian frame.  
One of the major issues at stake for the future is to conceive a theoretical 
frame for the structuring of post-Löschian cities, urban networks and regional 
structures, maybe using TTRs as a foundation. As urgent is the necessity of 
weaving a link between this necessary theorisation and the political world, 
whose responsibility it is to devise plans suiting their vision of the future 
territory, although their focus remains too often stuck in the handling of already 
existing structures. Tomorrow’s economic space cannot possibly be apprehended 
with yesterday’s territorial logics. 
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